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THE TWELFTH ANNUAL HONORABLE 
HELEN WILSON NIES MEMORIAL 
LECTURE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW* 
THE COPYRIGHT REVISION ACT OF 2026 
– JESSICA LITMAN** 
As someone who teaches and writes about copyright law, I end up 
straddling two different worlds.  On the one hand, I really do need to 
understand and be able to teach the details of the copyright statute and 
the case law construing it.  My students need to know the difference 
between a public performance right under Section 106(4) and a public 
performance right by digital audio transmission under Section 106(6); 
they need to know the difference between the statutory licenses 
available under Section 114 and the statutory licenses available under 
Section 115.1  So, I need to have all of those details pretty well nailed 
down.  At the same time, as an academic who writes normative and 
historical articles and books about copyright, and who tries to explain to 
her students why the statute works, or fails to work, the way it does, I 
need to be pretty well grounded in copyright theory and in the 
normative premises that are supposed to underlie the law. 
The disconnect between those two realms is serious, and growing.  
And, as a result, practicing copyright lawyers are finding much copyright 
 
* Audio of the Twelfth Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in 
Intellectual Property Law, held by Marquette University Law School (February 23, 2009) is 
available at http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pageID=919.  This lecture is 
delivered each spring semester by a nationally recognized scholar in the field of intellectual 
property law.   
** John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of 
Michigan.  Conversations with Jon Baumgarten, Abraham Drassinower, Dan Gifford, Kurt 
Hunt, Pam Samuelson, and Seana Shiffrin have been important to my thinking on the project 
that this speech is part of.  In addition, for 25 years Jon Weinberg has read everything that 
comes out of my printer before anyone else is allowed to see it.  Like all of my work, the 
speech is far better for his kibitzing. 
1. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4), 106(6), 114, 115 (2006).   
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scholarship less useful than they used to, and many copyright scholars 
are finding members of the copyright bar less thoughtful than they used 
to.  This is a field in which conferences for CLE credit are common, and 
the conferences commonly include both speakers who are law 
professors and speakers who are practicing copyright lawyers, so one 
gets to actually see folks snipe at each other.  When I read or listen to 
what august members of the copyright bar have to say about the work of 
copyright law professors, I read or hear grotesque caricatures of ideas 
no actual law professor I’ve ever met has read or said.  I assume that 
many copyright lawyers feel something similar. 
That’s a pity, because I believe that we’re about to embark on the 
beginning phases of another round of wholesale copyright revision.  
That’s exactly the sort of situation in which the groups might have a fair 
amount to offer one another.  
Why do I think that we are now in the initial stages of an effort to 
overhaul the copyright statute?  There are moves that copyright lawyers 
make when the law isn’t working well for them.  They avoid 
inconvenient statutory language by persuading courts that the words of 
the statute mean one thing in one context and a different thing in 
another context.  Under the 1909 Act, for example, the courts 
developed alternate definitions of the term “publication” for different 
purposes.2  Copyright lawyers sit down with other copyright lawyers and 
negotiate a series of band-aid solutions in which they agree to behave 
with one another as if the statute on the books said what they wished it 
said.  Under the 1909 Act, for example, music publishers and record 
labels devised “Harry Fox” licenses to track the compulsory mechanical 
license where they liked it and to vary its terms where they found the 
statute inconvenient.3  Although copyrights under the 1909 Act were 
formally indivisible, publishers devised a series of customary practices to 
allow them to behave as if different copyright rights could be separately 
owned.4 
In the ramp-up to actual copyright revision, copyright lawyers will 
meet in small groups to see if they can generate agreement on what the 
 
2. See William S. Strauss, Study No. 29:  Protection of Unpublished Works 8-15, in 1 
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 187, 198-205 (1963). 
3. See Harry G. Henn, Study No. 5:  The Compulsory Licensing Provisions of the U.S. 
Copyright Law 44-52, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 877, 922-30 (1963); William M. Blaisdell, 
Study No. 6:  The Economic Aspects of the Compulsory License 93-104, in 2 STUDIES ON 
COPYRIGHT 937, 941-52 (1963). 
4. See Abraham L. Kaminstein, Study No. 11:  Divisibility of Copyrights 18-25, in 1 
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 623, 642-49 (1963). 
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law ought to look like.  They will ask their pet legislators to float trial 
balloons.  They will use the tools that good lawyers have in their 
toolboxes to try to position themselves to claim that whatever copyright 
reform they seek is already well-established under current law.5 
We’ve been seeing a lot of that kind of thing recently.  In the 
multiple meanings department, we have fixation.  Copyright lawyers 
suggest that “fixed in tangible form”6 means one thing for the purposes 
of investing copyright and a different thing in connection with 
infringement.7  In the band-aid solutions department, we have notice 
and takedown: Lots of industry actors have informally agreed with each 
other to behave as if the notice and takedown provisions in Section 512 
of the copyright statute8 applied to a more expansive group of activities 
than the statute seems to contemplate.  In the jockeying for position 
department, we have a series of efforts to claim that the exclusive right 
under 106(3) of the statute to “distribute copies to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending” covers a 
very wide swathe of acts, some of which include no distribution, copies, 
sale, transfer of ownership, rental, lease, or lending.9  What happens 
next, if this era is like past ones, is a long, protracted process of 
negotiation to come up with what will be called something like The 
Copyright Revision Act of 2026  (to be fondly known as the ‘26 Act for 
short).   
 
5. For more detail on how these trends have manifested in the past, see JESSICA 
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22-69, 89-100 (2006). 
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“[A] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.”).  The same section defines “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is 
fixed by any method now known or later developed,” and “phonorecords” as “material 
objects in which sounds . . . are fixed by any method now known or later developed . . . .”  Id.  
7. Compare, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 104 Report:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Comm. of the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat121201.html (“we conclude that the making 
of temporary copies of a work in RAM implicates the reproduction right so long as the 
reproduction persists long enough to be perceived, copied, or communicated”), with, e.g., The 
Family Movie Act:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual 
Property of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat061704.html (“when software instructs a DVD player to 
mute certain sounds or skip past certain images in a motion picture being played on the 
DVD[, t]he putative derivative work is never fixed”). 
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3). 
9. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th 
Cir. 1997); Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
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The reason for all of this maneuvering is that the current copyright 
statute isn’t working the way anyone would like it to.  We all want the 
copyright system to nurture the creation, dissemination, and enjoyment 
of works of authorship.  That’s what copyright is for.  When it works 
well, it should encourage creators to make new works, assist 
intermediaries in disseminating them widely, and support readers, 
listeners, and viewers in enjoying them.  If the copyright system poses 
difficult entry barriers to creators, if it imposes complicated obstacles on 
intermediaries, if it inflicts burdensome conditions and gratuitous 
hurdles on readers, listeners, and viewers, then it is not going to work 
very well.  The current copyright law is flawed in all three respects. 
Let’s start with authors: Encouraging authors to create is supposed 
to be copyright’s central mechanism.  In the real copyright system, 
though, writers, artists, musicians, and filmmakers face daunting 
obstacles in searching for opportunities to write, paint, play, or film 
anything the public will see.  Every year, the news coverage of the South 
by Southwest music festival in Austin, Texas, marvels at all of the 
musicians who converge on the conference, some of them subsidized by 
governments in their home countries, in the hope of playing music that 
someone will actually hear10 (despite the fact that listeners complain that 
the music they hear on any given commercial radio station is the same 
as the music they hear on any other commercial radio station).  
Independent filmmakers finance their films on credit card debt and 
family loans and submit them to multiple film festivals without ever 
finding a distributor (despite the fact that this week the movie Friday the 
13th is playing on six different screens where I live).  Apprenticeships 
and entry-level jobs in the recording, film, photography, or theater 
business are so rare that they make tantalizing grand prizes for 
television reality shows.  There are about a zillion different how-to 
books and a fair number of monthly magazines on how to get your book 
published. 
Even when creators succeed in publishing a book, cutting an album, 
placing an article, or selling a screenplay, moreover, they typically earn 
only a small share of the proceeds of the copyright in their work.  A tiny 
minority get rich from copyright royalties.  A somewhat larger number 
are able to make a living from creating works of authorship.  The 
 
10. See, e.g., Jon Pareles, Stoking Careers in Frenzy of South by Southwest, NY TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 2009, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/arts/music/23sxsw.html; 
James Reed, A Strong International Contingent plays well in Austin, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 
23, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/ae/music/articles/2009/03/23/
a_strong_international_contingent_plays_well_in_austin/. 
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majority of creators, though, need day jobs to supplement their income.  
I’d guess that’s why some of you decided to go to law school. 
Why is that?  It’s not that nobody values works of authorship 
enough to spend money for them.  Studies of the size of the core 
copyright industries in the U.S. economy indicate that they generate 
nearly a trillion dollars.11  The reason is that very few of those dollars 
end up in creators’ pockets.  The copyright statute incorporates a bias in 
favor of distributors.  That bias comes at creators’ expense.  People 
argue that authors have very little bargaining power as compared with 
publishers, but that isn’t inherent in the natural order.  Rather, it 
reflects the fact that the American copyright law does now and always 
has tilted the playing field in distributors’ favor.  The disparity of 
bargaining power is at least largely an artifact of the way the copyright 
law works. 
Until recently, that tilt made a lot of practical sense.  Our copyright 
law was designed in an era in which mass distribution of copies of works 
required a significant capital investment.  We needed to shape the law in 
ways that channeled the largest share of the proceeds from copyrighted 
works to intermediary distributors so that they would buy the paper, 
operate the printing presses, put up the broadcast towers, put together 
the motion picture production companies, rent the warehouses, and 
drive the trucks that moved copies of works of authorship from authors 
to readers, listeners, and viewers.   
Today there are lots of ways to disseminate works to everyone in the 
world without having to spend much money.  Indeed, that fact has 
caused a copyright panic–individual readers, viewers, and listeners can 
send copies to each other, for close to free, without having to get them 
from a licensed source.   
Many of the large legacy distributors have good reason to find the 
current copyright climate uncomfortable.  Reasonable people can 
disagree about how the law should respond to that.  My own view is that 
if individuals can distribute copyrighted works less expensively than 
conventional distributors, it makes no sense at all to try to prevent the 
inexpensive, efficient distribution in order to protect the more 
expensive, less efficient distribution.  Rather, we should accept the fact 
that the role of intermediaries in the copyright system needs to evolve, 
and that, in the 21st century, it may no longer make sense to award the 
 
11. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. SIWEK, ECONOMISTS INC., COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE 
U.S. ECONOMY:  THE 2006 REPORT (2006), available at 
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2006_siwek_full.pdf. 
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intermediaries so large a share of the copyright bargain.  Indeed, doing 
so may generate perverse results. 
Even for lean, mean, innovative distributors committed to digital 
distribution, the current copyright system is a disaster.  A distributor 
seeking to exploit works in new media faces daunting difficulties in 
identifying the rights-holders entitled to license its uses and negotiating 
the terms of any licenses.  Even established industry groups have 
complained that the licensing provisions of the current law are simply 
unworkable.12  Innovations like copyright divisibility, which seemed like 
a good idea at the time, have vastly complicated the licensing of 
copyrighted works by subjecting would-be licensees to multiple and 
sometimes inconsistent demands.13  Small businesses who want to pay 
reasonable royalties for the opportunity to exploit works in new markets 
can face insuperable difficulties in arranging to do so.  And, as new 
entrants like MP3.com, ReplayTV, and iCrave TV learned the hard 
way, trying and failing to cross the Ts and dot the Is, even with the 
advice of counsel, is a great way to find yourself sued into bankruptcy.14 
There’s a second class of intermediaries who have been important in 
the copyright system as a historical matter.  These entrepreneurs have 
not, historically, owned copyrights or licensed copyright uses.  Rather, 
they have invested in the copyright system by making instruments and 
objects that allow people to enjoy copyrighted works.  I call them 
“makers.”  They make pianos and trumpets and televisions and 
computers and VCRs and iPods.  The folks who make trumpets and the 
folks who make iPods are in the business of making money, sometimes 
lots of money, from music written by other people.  Indeed, their entire 
business model is the commercial exploitation of other people’s music.  
But, because they don’t themselves engage in any of the actions that the 
copyright law reserves to copyright owners, they haven’t had to worry 
about the copyright law.  Until recently. 
These days, distributor entrepreneurs are looking at maker 
entrepreneurs and demanding that they redesign their business models 
 
12.  See Reforming Section 115 of the Copyright Act for the Digital Age:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Comm. of the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (testimony of MaryBeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat032207-1.html. 
13. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 673 (2003). 
14. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePlay TV, 298 F. Supp. 2d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2004); 
Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCRAVETV, 53 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1831 (W.D. Pa. 2000). 
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to cut distributor entrepreneurs in.  To put some teeth in what would 
otherwise be a nice, but futile, request, they’re filing suit for 
contributory infringement or “inducement” of infringement and then 
offering to settle for a fat slice of revenue, a large dollop of digital rights 
management, and a fair amount of control.   
So, the current copyright law isn’t working well for creators.  It isn’t 
working well for distributors, and it’s getting scarier and scarier for 
makers. 
Well, how does it work for readers, listeners, and viewers?  
Traditionally, copyright law was designed to encourage reading, 
viewing, and listening by leaving readers (and viewers and listeners) 
alone.  The works protected by copyright were few, the rights conferred 
by the copyright statute were narrow, and the boundaries outside them 
left huge free spaces that allowed readers, listeners, and viewers to 
enjoy copyrighted works as they wanted to without needing to worry 
much about what the copyright law said.  There weren’t many express 
user rights in the statute, and they were (and are) a peculiarly motley 
collection—basically Congress or the courts have stepped in to add 
express user rights only when copyright owners overreached the 
boundaries of these narrow exclusive rights.  So, we have specific 
provisions allowing people to play videogames in public places or to use 
censorware in their homes to block the sexual or violent scenes in 
movies released on DVDs.15  The provisions are exceptional, and most 
of them trace their origin from ill-considered lawsuits.16 
Instead of setting out the scope of individual audience interests in 
explicit terms, the basic architecture of the system respected the rights 
of readers, listeners, and viewers by limiting the reach of copyright 
rights. 
That’s been changing, though.  Part of what’s fueling the change is 
that copyright owners are upset about unlicensed digital distribution 
and want to make sure that readers and listeners don’t undermine the 
markets of publishers and record labels by giving away for free what 
copyright owners sell.  That has inspired them both to identify 
unlicensed consumer uses as “piracy” and to persuade Congress to enact 
tough provisions making it illegal to circumvent copy protection.  
 
15. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(e), 110(11). 
16. See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that playing a coin-operated video game in a video arcade constitutes a public 
performance within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)); Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. 
Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (holding defendants liable for making and 
distributing censored versions of copyrighted motion pictures). 
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Consumers are experiencing copy-protection as a modest but significant 
inconvenience that probably to some degree prevents reading, listening, 
and viewing that would otherwise happen.  So far, it doesn’t seem to 
have made much of a dent in unlicensed uses. 
Another part of the story has been the relentless pressure to expand 
the scope of the individual bounded copyright rights so that they’re no 
longer so bounded.  Copyright owners need to do this in order to have 
any real hope of holding makers liable for enabling new uses by 
individual readers, listeners, and viewers.  This expansion is, by and 
large, non-statutory.  Copyright owners have been advancing liberal 
constructions of the individual copyright rights in courts, in treaty 
negotiations, and in their copyright rhetoric.  Under these constructions, 
any unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is prima facie infringing.  
The goal isn’t really to be able to bring copyright infringement suits 
against millions of individuals, notwithstanding the 20,000 John Doe 
suits brought by the record labels.  Rather, copyright owners would like 
to be able to recover infringement verdicts against the maker 
intermediaries I mentioned earlier, who are facilitating unlicensed uses 
of copyrighted works.  Typically, as I said earlier, the maker isn’t itself 
doing anything the copyright law prohibits, but it’s making money from 
selling individuals something—like a VCR, a DVR, an MP3 player—
that allows them to make lots of individual unlicensed uses.  Or, it’s 
selling online advertising on sites where copyright infringement may be 
going on.  In order to argue that the maker is liable as a contributory or 
vicarious infringer or an inducer, one needs to persuade a court that lots 
of individuals out there are violating the law.   
Finally, copyright owners have been pushing these expansive 
constructions because they suspect things are going on that they can’t 
prove, but they’d like to be able to get an injunction and damages for 
things that they can prove—even if what they can prove isn’t really what 
the statute says is illegal.   
Consumers are caught in these pincers.  There’s no evidence in any 
of the legislative history of any of the copyright laws that Congress ever 
intended to make most personal uses illegal.  It didn’t matter a lot, 
because, until recently, unlicensed uses by individuals in their homes 
were hard to monitor and hard to prevent.  Today, though, anything 
that happens on a digital network can be monitored, and if it can be 
monitored, there are at least some efforts to use technological tools to 
either prevent it or to detect and avenge it.  Many of those tools have 
other uses that can constrain how individuals read, watch, or listen to 
material or can facilitate massive surveillance.  DVD players already 
NIES 2009 FINAL FORMATTED REVISED 6-18-09 6/19/2009  2:53 PM 
2009] THE COPYRIGHT REVISION ACT OF 2026 257 
 
prevent consumers from fast-forwarding through coming attractions or 
watching a foreign DVD on a domestic DVD player.  Copyright owners 
are pushing the federal government to require television manufacturers 
to equip all television receivers with tools that would allow monitoring 
and control of TV viewing.17  Computers already come with technology 
that allows some monitoring of computer uses; copyright owners are 
pushing Internet service providers to engage in wholesale monitoring 
and filtering of Internet use.18  Comcast, for one, has already been 
caught deploying some tools to mess with Internet connections to block 
the use of software that has disproportionately infringing uses.19  Bottom 
line for consumers: their historic copyright liberties to read, view, and 
listen to works are shrinking fast, and a fair amount of reading, listening, 
and viewing that would otherwise happen is discouraged by the hassle 
factor. 
So, we have a copyright statute that is currently failing its 
constituents in multiple ways.  We have signs that copyright lawyers are 
gearing up for a statutory overhaul.  If one were an optimist, this would 
seem like a perfect opportunity to fix what’s broken. 
I’m not an optimist. 
I would like to be.  I would like to think that we have a rare 
opportunity for copyright scholars and copyright lawyers to sit down 
with representatives of creators, distributors, readers, listeners, and 
viewers and come up with a workable replacement for the current law.  
It would be short—really short.  In the best case, people affected by it 
would be able to understand it without consulting a copyright lawyer.  It 
would correct the current tilt in the playing field toward distributors.  By 
this I mean both that it would give creators more meaningful rights 
under the law and that it would reduce the current incentives for 
intermediaries to artificially constrain the dissemination and enjoyment 
of copyrighted works.  It would preserve historic copyright liberties for 
readers, listeners, and viewers.  It would nonetheless reward investment 
in creative endeavors with the opportunity to profit from the 
 
17. See Broadcast and Audio Flag:  Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006), available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=
4237da77-4ae9-4e2d-b03d-215dcc725eae. 
18.  See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL 
ST. J., Dec.  19, 2008, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122966038836021137.html.   
19. See In re Free Press v. Comcast, FCC 08-183 (Aug. 2008), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_ public/attachmatch/FCC-08-183A1.pdf. 
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commercial and public exploitation of copyrighted works.  It would try 
to provide easy licensing opportunities to make it simple for people who 
want to pay to use copyrighted material to do so, but without 
affirmatively encouraging investment in exclusionary, anti-competitive 
tactics.   
Let me stop and defend that list of goals.  My first goal is that the 
copyright law should be short and comprehensible to people without the 
aid of a copyright lawyer.  That may seem odd.  After all, the state of 
Michigan pays me to train copyright lawyers, so the more demand there 
is for copyright lawyers, the more value there is in what I do.  But that 
doesn’t make a need for lots of copyright lawyers a good thing.  
Consider bankruptcy lawyers.  The current economic climate surely 
means that demand for bankruptcy lawyers is skyrocketing, but that 
doesn’t make it good news.  Or, to switch professions, consider 
physicians who study the transmission of terrible infectious disease.  A 
massive outbreak of a dire plague would undoubtedly make their 
workdays more interesting, but if you asked them if they’d just as soon 
the disease were contained before anyone could catch it, it’s pretty 
obvious what they would say.  I think a law that didn’t require creators, 
distributors, makers, readers, listeners, and viewers to have copyright 
lawyers at their elbow would be a big improvement over the one we 
have now, which does.  So, short is important to me.   
Next on my list is to rebalance the ways the law deals the cards to 
creators and distributors, to give creators a stronger hand and to give 
distributors a weaker one.  The pervasive favoring of distributors in the 
current law is largely an artifact of their political clout.  Still, when paper 
was expensive, when mass dissemination required a printing press, a 
broadcast tower, a CD stamping plant, it was an artifact that made a lot 
of practical sense.  Today, we need to realize that if we’re in the business 
of bribing distributors to invest in mass dissemination, we are able to 
bribe them with less because they can engage in mass dissemination 
much more cheaply.  Moreover, if individual consumers can distribute 
copyrighted works to one another at minimal cost, we may not need to 
bribe commercial distributors to do it at all.  For some sorts of works—
scientific or legal research is one example—we may not need 
commercial publishers. 
Moreover, some of the worst excesses of copyright—the ones that 
make it look illegitimate in the eyes of college students—are, arguably, 
at least partly a result of the fact that distributors’ incentives to invest in 
copyright are too large.  These incentives motivate them to behave in 
ways that are bad for the system.  Once distributors have vested 
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interests in the copyright system, though, they may take advantage of 
opportunities to enhance their share of its benefits in ways that aren’t 
healthy for the system as a whole.  So long as distributors’ incentive to 
invest in works of authorship encourages creation and enjoyment, it is a 
useful part of the copyright ecosystem.  Once the incentive to invest is 
so large that it makes sense to try to suppress the creation, distribution, 
or enjoyment of works one controls, or works that compete with those 
one controls, the incentive has become counterproductive.   
It seems to me that that’s what has happened over the past thirty or 
so years.  The copyright incentives for distributors to invest in acquiring 
copyrights to works have simply grown way too large.  Those incentives 
apparently suffice to inspire distributors to divert resources to 
artificially constraining outlets for copyrighted works to better enable 
them to capture monopoly rents.  By rebalancing the copyright bargain, 
we can both reduce distributor incentives to undermine the health of the 
system and also enhance the benefits we can afford to make available to 
creators.  Who wouldn’t want that? 
My third goal is a copyright law that preserves historic copyright 
liberties for readers, listeners, and viewers.  I don’t know that this 
requires a lot of defense.  The reason we want to encourage authors to 
create and distributors to disseminate works of authorship is so that 
people will read the books, listen to the music, look at the art, watch the 
movies, play the games, build and inhabit the architecture.  That’s how 
copyright law promotes the progress of science.  Although some 
copyright rhetoric seems to imply that so long as the law gives strong 
incentives to create and distribute works, it doesn’t matter whether 
anybody reads or listens to them, I don’t think anyone actually believes 
that.  In practical terms, that means we need to makes sure there’s 
enough space, enough freedom, enough liberty built into the law to 
ensure that the law doesn’t get in the way of reading, viewing, and 
listening. 
Those are general goals that should shape the way that copyright law 
rewards creativity and investment in creative endeavors.  I find it easy to 
imagine a variety of different new copyright laws that would meet those 
goals.  Every few years, I ask all my copyright students to try to write 
one, and they’ve come up with very useful and very different ways of 
doing it. 
When copyright lawyers and copyright scholars sit down at real 
tables in real conference rooms and try to talk about reforming the 
copyright law, though, everything is much more difficult.  Copyright 
scholars have, by and large, no constituency and no political clout, so 
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folks are going to listen to us only if they feel we have something 
worthwhile to say.  Recently, as I’ve said, the view of much of the 
copyright bar is that we don’t.  Indeed, I’ll go further, and say that at 
least some highly respected copyright lawyers have suggested that 
copyright scholars advance dangerous and misleading views of the law 
that, if taken seriously, could undermine the integrity of the entire 
copyright system.20  The copyright lawyers I’ve been talking with 
represent clients, some of whom do have some political clout.  Because 
they have clients, of course, they’ve got good reasons to try to retain any 
advantages they believe they get from the law on the books while 
getting rid of the disadvantages.  For some of them, the prospect of 
copyright reform is a way to both cement their most heroic (by which I 
mean least plausible) victories and reverse their unanticipated defeats.  
Since we have lawyers on both sides of those cases, we can throw the 
idea of a short law right out the window.  The history of past revision 
efforts is a protracted negotiation in which everyone ultimately agrees 
to ratify the general concept of their historic victories while negating 
their application to the specific facts that generated the lawsuits.  Doing 
that for lots of controversial cases can generate a very long, complicated 
law that doesn’t seem to make a lot of policy sense. 
That’s why I’m not optimistic.  The trouble with the laws that come 
out of a process like that is that in the long run, they aren’t good for 
anyone.  They undermine the public’s sense that copyright law is 
legitimate and worth upholding.  
So, I’d like to challenge you to a thought experiment.  I assume that 
my assertion about the purpose of copyright is uncontroversial.  I’ll 
repeat it: We want the copyright system to nurture the creation, 
dissemination, and enjoyment of works of authorship.  When it works 
well, it should encourage creators to make new works, assist distributors 
in disseminating them widely, and support readers, listeners, and 
viewers in enjoying them.  We may individually disagree on which of the 
three interests should prevail in the event of a conflict.  We may have 
different ideas about how one gets there from here.  We may differ 
about, if there are extra statutory goodies to spread around, which 
interest has the strongest entitlement to be given them.  We would all, 
though, agree that the current law leaves some things to be desired in 
how it accomplishes these three goals. 
 
20. See, e.g., Henry Horbaczewski, Copyright Under Siege:  Some Thoughts of a 
Publisher’s Counsel:  The Sixth Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture, 54 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 387 (2006). 
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Rather than looking at copyright reform as an avenue to nail some 
things down and pry other things up, I suggest looking at it as an 
opportunity to rethink the subject entirely.  If this statutory revision is 
like the last couple, it will consume a bunch of years.  That’s going to be 
a substantial chunk of your professional lives.  Instead of nibbling 
around the edges, let’s imagine that everything is up for grabs.  It won’t 
be, but thinking about it as if it is will help each of us to figure out what 
is important to rethink and what we can get away with merely 
remodeling.   
If we were writing on a blank slate, how could we craft a law that 
would meet those goals?  Forget, for the moment, everything you know 
about copyright law.  Forget the six exclusive rights, the exclusions and 
exemptions, the compulsory licenses, and the four fair use factors.  
Could you write a statute that is better for authors, distributors, readers, 
listeners, and viewers than the one we have now?  Of course you could.  
What would it look like? 
The first objection I expect to hear to this thought experiment is that 
we have treaty obligations that constrain us when we think about 
redesigning the copyright law.  They constrain us less, though, if we 
don’t assume that the current barnacle-encrusted design of the law is a 
given: It is okay under both the Berne Convention21 and TRIPS,22 for 
example, for us to redesign the law so that we move power and control 
away from distributors and towards authors.  Imagine, for example, a 
real termination right that allowed authors to terminate any transfer at 
any time after 10 years had elapsed from the date of the grant.  People 
might raise all sorts of objections to that proposal on a lot of policy 
grounds, but it would go a part of the way toward shifting the copyright 
balance from distributors to creators and it would be fine under Berne 
and TRIPS.  Indeed, we can go much further than that:  We could offer 
authors meaningful attribution and integrity rights.  That’s not only fine 
under Berne and TRIPS, Berne requires it.  We’re in breach of our 
treaty obligations because we promised we would do that and failed to 
follow up.  Similarly, a host of private copying exclusions appear to be 
Berne—and TRIPS—compliant.  A variety of different reformulations 
of the exclusive rights would pass muster under Berne and TRIPS. 
 
21. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
last revised July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
22. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1144, 1197 (1994). 
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This is to say that our treaty obligations leave us a fair amount of 
room.23  More importantly, though, the kinds of incentives that made 
sense in the 19th or even the 20th century may not make sense in the 21st.  
If we figure out something that would work better than the current 
model of copyright law, and we figure out why, then from there we can 
try to sort out whether we can fit it within our treaty obligations or 
whether it’s worthwhile to seek to vary the terms of the relevant 
treaties. 
Besides, it’s just a thought experiment.  If everyone in the room 
went home and wrote down a draft statute, none of those bills would 
end up being enacted as The Copyright Revision Act of 2026.  It seems 
entirely possible, though, that if we all indulge in this thought 
experiment or ones like it, the conversations we are doomed to have 
about copyright reform over the next eighteen or so years will be more 
civil, more interesting, and more useful. 
 
 
23. Accord P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, CONCEIVING AN 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT:  FINAL 
REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ivir.nl/ publications/hugenholtz/limitations_exceptions
_copyright.pdf. 
